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Paso Robles Municipal Airport Physical Security Assessment Report May 20, 2024

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The following appendices are included as separate documents, but are a part of this assessment report:

Appendix 1 – Security Perimeter Map 1 (Airport AOA Boundary)

Appendix 2 – Security Perimeter Map 2 (West Side AOA Boundary)

Appendix 3 – Security Perimeter Map 3 (South Side AOA Boundary)

Appendix 4 – Paso Robles Airport Security Recommendation Prioritization List

INTRODUCTION

Lowery and Associates Security Consulting, LLC was retained by the City of Paso Robles (COPR) to conduct a physical security assessment (PSA) of its Municipal Airport location in Paso Robles, California. The PSA provides an independent evaluation and analysis of existing risks, threats, vulnerabilities, and offers recommendations for specific security countermeasures and improvements. Goals for this project included:

- Create and provide a standardized set of “Tools” for performing Physical Security Assessments to provide for consistency in the inspection and evaluation of COPR facilities;
- Provide experienced and trained security and law enforcement experts to perform the physical security assessment and prepare the deliverables for this project;
- Establish a threat assessment methodology for COPR that will identify internal and external threats, identify critical assets, analyze vulnerabilities, assess and rank the level of security threat and risk for the COPR location;
- Perform an on-site, comprehensive assessment of the COPR facility with assessment team members to document existing conditions and operations and identify improvements needed to achieve or surpass industry best practices;
- Conduct independent security technology assessments for each location to document existing security systems & equipment, and their use, as well as power and communication infrastructure available to support such systems;
- Conduct a preliminary review of existing technology and infrastructure to support potential security systems for each location, including availability, capacity and layout of network communication and power infrastructure available to support such systems; and
- Prepare a comprehensive assessment report that includes findings and prioritized recommendations with budget estimates for the location.

This PSA included the assessment, evaluation and formulation of recommendations related to the administrative, physical technology and operational security for the property. The assessment report describes findings and observations and includes prioritized recommendations that are easy to understand and are actionable. The following subject areas were reviewed during the assessment and have been addressed in the report:

General Site/Building Security

The physical security elements of the site and building were assessed. Specifically, the following areas were reviewed and assessed:


- Site Perimeter
- Building Exteriors
- Building Interiors
- Facility Parking
- Facility Lighting
- Facility Signage
- Historical Security Incidents & Activity



Administrative Security

The development, management, administration, and maintenance of the facility's overall security program was reviewed and evaluated. This portion of the assessment was focused on management roles, responsibilities for security and the development and implementation of security policies, plans, and procedures. Specifically, the following areas were reviewed and assessed:

- Security Roles & Responsibilities
- Security Funding & Support
- Security Policies, Programs & Procedures
- Employment Termination Practices
- Employee Pre-Employment Screening
- Security Education & Awareness
- Security Information / Incident Reporting
- Information Protection Practices



Security Technology & Controls

Team members reviewed current system operations and evaluated how existing security equipment is being used to address current security program requirements, including noting the lack of such systems. Physical security systems and controls evaluated included:

- Vehicle Access, Traffic and Parking Control
- Employee, Customer, Contractor, and Vendor Access
- Access Control & Badge/Identification Systems
- Video Surveillance and Recording Systems
- Intrusion Detection & Hold-up/Burglar Alarm Systems
- Security Communications Systems
- Internal Property/Product Controls
- Shipping, Receiving & Storage Operations
- Lock and Key Control
- Physical Access to Computer Network Resources
- Protection of Building Utilities & Air Intakes
- Security technology vendor services & preventative maintenance



Physical Security Operations

The operations, or the need thereof, of security officer staff was reviewed and evaluated. Specifically, the following areas were reviewed and assessed:

- Security Staffing and Operations
- Security Staff Scheduling and Task Assignment
- Security Staff Training
- Security Post Instructions & Documents
- Security Uniforms and Equipment



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In March 2024, the City of Paso Robles (COPR) engaged Lowery and Associates Security Consulting, LLC to conduct an assessment of the existing state of physical security, security systems, and security operations provided and operated at the City's Municipal Airport located in Paso Robles, CA. The outcome of this physical security assessment has resulted in identifying and defining specific improvements to site physical security elements, as well as improvements in administrative and operational security practices.

During the assessment, six (6) separate interviews were conducted with city staff, airport tenants and stakeholders for the site. These interviews revealed some common concerns, including:

- Many areas allowing uncontrolled access to the AOA;
- Outdated and inoperable vehicle and pedestrian gates, as well as locks;
- No dedicated management and oversight over the security function at the site;
- No established security policies, procedures, emergency response plans or guidance;
- Lack of formal security education, awareness and training for employees and tenants; and
- Little to no security presence at the airport to deter or respond to security incidents

During the assessment, these areas of concern were assessed, along with numerous other topics, and recommendations were formulated, when warranted, to enhance and improve the safety and security of these prioritized areas of concern.

The findings of the Consultant Team revealed that security for the airport has been managed largely as an ad hoc or adjunct responsibility of the Airport Manager. An organized security program, with dedicated security leadership and direction, has not been instituted and maintained at the airport. There is a significant lack of barriers and controls to limit unauthorized access to the air operations area (AOA). In addition, the airport has not been equipped with electronic access control or video surveillance systems, which are included in FAA guidelines for general aviation (GA) airports and are standard best practices today for similar environments. It was apparent during the assessment that some security improvements are needed to address current risks and to comply with FAA guidelines and industry standards and best practices. The recommendations detailed within this report reflect improvements that can enhance the current security program for the airport.

In total, one-hundred-forty-six (146) recommendations have been made for specific security improvements. Recommendations have been prioritized into three (3) categories (Critical, Important, and Desirable) to assist the City to prioritize, plan and budget for specific security improvements. Some of the most serious findings and recommendations generated from the assessment are detailed below:

- **Uncontrolled AOA Access:** Significant portions of the airport have little or no fencing or barriers to prevent unauthorized access to the airport property and directly to the AOA. In many areas of the airport, any delineation between landside and airside is not clear and no boundary exists to separate these operating areas. Much of the AOA boundary is under the control of various airport tenants, with many commercial tenants operating non-air operations within the AOA. Where fencing, vehicle gates, and pedestrian gates have been installed to limit access to the AOA, these elements fall short of FAA guidelines and best practices or are currently inoperable or unsecured. With a few exception areas, most of the fencing around the perimeter of the airport does not meet FAA guidelines and would not deter or prevent unauthorized access to the airport.

Recommendation: We have made numerous recommendations for specific fence and gate improvements to establish control of the AOA and airport perimeter. As part of this assessment report, we have included “Security Perimeter Map” exhibits that illustrate recommendations for separating landside from airside operations in accordance with FAA guidelines and where to establish vehicle gate controls and pedestrian gate controls to limit unauthorized access to the AOA. These recommendations will actually lower the overall number of automated vehicle gate entrances, while improving the AOA boundary delineation between landside and airside operations. This effort will have the added benefit of positioning existing non-aeronautical, commercial tenant businesses, like the Treana Winery and Greater California Financial facilities, outside of the airside AOA.

- **Executive Security Leadership:** There is no physical security management presence employed at the airport, or available to assist with security planning, preparedness, and response. No single senior management position has been designated as the responsible officer for security at the airport and all security matters must be absorbed by the current Airport Manager or by the Paso Robles Police Department. The lack of clear ownership of the physical security function could lead to a lack of appropriate focus and attention to security needs and issues, as well as a lack of clarity for City leadership during security, emergency, and crisis events.

Recommendation: We recommend firmly establishing the role and responsibility for oversight and management of security within the Airport Manager’s job description and provide resources for security subject matter expertise, guidance, and education. When the Assistant Airport Manager/Airport Operations Manager role is filled at the airport, make this position the leader for managing the site’s day-to-day physical security program and be responsible for administrative, physical, and operational security implementation and management, under the supervision of the Airport Manager. This individual should have, or endeavor to develop, executive physical security management experience and training. It would be expected that this individual would be the primary liaison with the police department and would engage with other City department heads and officials to carry out operational, administrative and physical security initiatives and programs.

- **Site Security Systems:** The Paso Robles Airport is not equipped with any usable security systems to control and document access to the AOA or to the terminal building after business hours, to provide recorded surveillance, or to trigger monitored alarms for break-ins or other unwanted activity. The lack of access controls and video surveillance for the airport falls significantly short of FAA guidelines and best practices for GA airports and is a major vulnerability for the City of Paso Robles.

Recommendation: We have included recommendations for the installation of modern electronic access control, alarm, and video surveillance systems throughout the airport terminal area and around the AOA boundary, especially the active airside areas on the west and south sides of the airport. In total we have recommended the installation of new electronic access controls for (12) automatic vehicle gates, (8) pedestrian gates, (6) terminal buildings doors, and (26) video surveillance cameras. In addition to the ability to manage and monitor these systems in the airport manager’s office area, we have recommended that these systems include the ability to be remotely monitored by Paso Robles Police Dispatchers located in the Public Safety Center after hours.

- **Security Policies and Procedures:** A comprehensive airport security plan, with specific security policies and security operating procedures has not been developed to establish the authority, responsibility and specific procedures and instructions for implementing and managing the facility’s overall security program. The lack of an airport master security plan falls short of FAA guidelines for GA airports.

Recommendation: We recommend engaging subject matter expertise and resources to develop a comprehensive airport master security plan for the facility, to include detailed security policies, operating

procedures and instructions. This set of documents shall serve to provide the guidance and direction necessary to properly implement and manage a sound security program for the airport. We also recommend developing detailed response plans for each type of foreseeable security incident, event or emergency.

By following and acting on the recommendations contained in this report, the City of Paso Robles will be set on a course to successfully define, develop and implement a suitable physical security program for the airport, helping to ensure the safety and protection of City employees, airport tenants, operators, assets and its citizens.

This Assessment Report should not be interpreted as an exhaustive study of all existing conditions, deficiencies, and/or code/standard compliance. The report represents the Consultant Team's professional opinions, based on experience and observations, and do not imply any warranty by the Consulting Firm and/or the Consulting Team Members.